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1. Overview 
Due to poor civil engineering practices, corruption, natural disasters, the sabotage of 
infrastructure associated with Colombia’s armed conflict, and the politicisation of large 
infrastructure projects, Colombia is spending a significant amount annually on improving and 
rebuilding relatively new infrastructure. As the country’s population and economy continue to 
grow, so do its economic loses. This rapid literature review synthesises findings from academic, 
practitioner, and policy literature published in the past five years that discuss the factors that 
influence the reoccurrence of infrastructure project failures in Colombia and the public 
procurement checks and balances that been adopted to reduce their likelihood. It draws on 
English and Spanish language sources. The five main reasons identified in the literature for the 
failure of Colombia’s infrastructure are: 
Poor civil engineering is associated with inadequate initial design and design changes, an 
insufficient initial budget, lack of supervision, unexpected events, a lack of professional 
experience and competence, inadequate quality of work, poor budget and resource management 
and a lack of knowledge of construction and planning policy (Forcada, et al., 2017). In some 
cases, policies of social inclusion have resulted in the employment of local inexperienced 
contractors and workers. These major defining characteristics lead to a high rate of 
reconstruction and unnecessary effort in repeating poorly completed or incomplete work resulting 
in budget overruns. In ageing infrastructure, a preference for new construction over maintenance 
has resulted in increasingly deteriorated existing infrastructure, further increasing failure rates. 
Natural disasters are mostly associated with extreme rainfall events and earthquakes and can 
cause frequent flooding and landslides which impact important transport corridors. Heavy rainfall 
further complicates the maintenance and operation of surface transport by inhibiting repairs and 
upgrades (Wettling, et al., 2015). 
Corruption is a serious hurdle for the government and companies operating or investing in 
Colombia’s infrastructure. Various factors contribute to corruption including organised crime, drug 
trafficking, a lack of government transparency, and weak regulations for securing investments 
and their monitoring. To address this the Government of Columbia (GoC) is trying to improve 
transparency and access to information and to strengthen the legal framework and government 
structures (International Monetary Fund, 2018). 
Infrastructure sabotage mainly perpetrated by guerrilla forces and criminal groups (the 
“BACRIM”, formerly the paramilitary groups)1, during the course of Colombia’s 50+ year armed 
conflict, has resulted in frequent attacks on oil and electricity infrastructure. 
The politicisation of large infrastructure projects. An ongoing series of papers by IABD 
(2018, forthcoming) on megaprojects in Latin American highlight how infrastructure megaprojects 
tend to be politicised – whereby political criteria and elections often dominate decision-making. 
                                                   
 
1 The BACRIM (Bandas criminals) are groups mainly made up of former paramilitaries who were officially 
demobilised from 2006. The term describes many different criminal groups and enterprises, including the third 
generation of Colombian drugs traffickers (McDermott, 2014; Herbert & Menocal, 2014). 
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Meanwhile, prefeasibility studies, feasibility studies and evaluations are often dominated by 
political actors and processes, and by the construction companies or the financiers of the 
projects.  
Colombia’s gross domestic product (GDP) has tripled over the past decade, however inadequate 
and insufficient infrastructure is a major threat to its economy, and improving its infrastructure is 
needed to boost the country’s competitiveness. Although significant investment in infrastructure 
has been taking place in Colombia, infrastructure project failures are severely constraining the 
impacts of these investments. 
The literature suggests that corruption is the major reason for the ineffectiveness of public 
procurement checks and balances. Efforts to improve public sector organisation by ring-fencing 
agencies/activities historically prone to corruption his has been led by a number of government 
anti-corruption initiatives including the establishment of the National Infrastructure Agency (ANI). 
2. Background 
Colombia ranks 66th overall out of 137 countries in the World Economic Forum’s (WEF) Global 
Competitiveness Index 2017–2018. For infrastructure its position falls to 87th out of 137 
countries. There has been significant investment to address the lack of infrastructure provision. 
However, Colombia, compared with most other emerging economies has a large gap between 
existing infrastructure provision and that which is required to support the economy. This is due to 
a fragmented institutional and regulatory framework, low technical capacity and low levels of 
strategic management and vision.  
Figure 1: The WEF Global Competitiveness Index in detail: Colombia 
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Source: World Economic Forum (2018, p.93) 
Many infrastructure projects in Colombia suffer construction and maintenance delays, leading to 
contract renegotiation or termination (World Bank, 2011). A lack of supervision, design changes, 
unexpected events, lack of experience and inadequate quality of execution, poor budget 
management and resource management, errors, and lack of valuable knowledge of construction 
and planning policy, cause infrastructure expenditure in most cases to exceed project budgets 
(Forcada, et al., 2017).  
The renewal and rework of failed infrastructure projects increase construction costs and the 
duration to complete projects (Ashwell, 2018) (Forcada, et al., 2017). A recent example was the 
failure of the Chirajara suspension bridge, which collapsed during its construction phase due to a 
lack of reinforcement in the cross-beam. The bridge is part of the main thoroughfare connecting 
Bogota to the south east city of Villavicencio (Ashwell, 2018). 
Therefore, Colombia is facing infrastructure shortage; improvements in strategies and policies 
are needed in order to maintain, develop and operate its infrastructure system to manage 
demand and mitigate against unexpected events. Notwithstanding the strong economic 
performance, there is a gap in infrastructure provision needs and a lack of the availability of 
capital resources for financing these requirements.  
Infrastructure gap 
The Government of Colombia (GoC) has implemented a number of reforms to its institutional and 
regulatory system to improve the investment level and enhance the role of Public Private 
Partnerships (PPPs). For example, the Agencia de Infraestructura (National Infrastructure 
Agency, ANI) was created to oversee the structuring and management of road concessions and 
the Financiera de Desarrollo Nacional (FDN) was created to provide the infrastructure sector with 
long-term funding and innovative financial products (World Bank, 2014a). A number of public 
agencies were given a mandate to provide project structuring services to develop a pipeline of 
projects and the 2013 Infrastructure Law was designed to tackle some of the most pressing 
transport bottlenecks that have historically led to cost-overruns and delays in transport projects 
(World Bank, 2014a).  
Despite these achievements, an infrastructure gap still persists, rooted in fragmented institutional 
and regulatory framework and low levels of investment that lack a strategic vision. Colombia’s 
transport infrastructure lags behind other countries, particularly its roads where it has 26% less 
kilometres of roads than a country with similar characteristics (Yepes Ramírez & Villar, 2013, p.1; 
Deloitte, 2017). Colombia’s road infrastructure is 214,400 kms long, but only 12% is paved 
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(Wettling, et al., 2015) and a large part of its secondary and tertiary road are in average or poor 
condition. Colombia’s low levels of transport infrastructure investment is aggravated by problems 
with the poor quality of its infrastructure, as demonstrated by its low ranking in the WEF’s Global 
Competitiveness Report (Yepes Ramírez & Villar, 2013, p.2). This is because the transport 
sector has been characterised by inadequate policy and planning capacity, a lack of a multimodal 
policy, short-term and reactive management, and a shortage of technical personnel in agencies 
and volatile budget allocations (World Bank, 2014a). These have impeded a long-term 
maintenance strategy which implies that higher financial requirements are needed to overcome 
the resulting backlog of deferred maintenance. 
Lack of investment in infrastructure  
Lack of investment in infrastructure has occurred due to Colombia having a complex geography 
with populated areas that are distant from one another (see Figure 2), an extreme climate and 
also due to historically low levels of public investment (especially in the 1990s), and institutional 
weaknesses in stimulated private investment. The low levels of public investment suggest a lack 
of value given to: (a) productive investment compared to social investment; and (b) medium and 
long-term capital investments compared to the political economy of public spending. For 
example, transport infrastructure is ‘the first thing to be cut in a crisis and the last thing to be 
increased during phases of growth’ (Yepes, Ramírez & Villar, 2013, p.3) 
Figure 2: Distance of populated cities in Colombia 
 
It will take a big effort to close the gap in infrastructure investment. However, it has been 
improving. Between 2001 and 2009, 0.8% of GDP was invested in transport infrastructure. This 
increased to 1.25% of GDP in 2010 and 2011. One of the recent successes in attracting private 
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investment into infrastructure has been the development of the Asociación Público Privado (APP) 
and the creation of the National Infrastructure Agency (ANI) (Deloitte, 2017). 
Institutional problems 
Institutions are particularly critical for the infrastructure sector as the sector requires the 
permanent interaction of public and private agents, and investment in the long term, which 
means confidence is of central importance (Yepes, et al., 2013, p.60). Yet, Colombia’s transport 
infrastructure sector has a low level of institutional development (Yepes, et al, 2013, p.60). While 
the government has made progress on institutional reform in recent years (e.g. creating the ANI), 
it has not been sufficient. 
Yepes, et al. (2013, p.60) compare the successes of Colombia’s energy infrastructure institutions 
post-1990s, against the weaknesses of its transport infrastructure institutions. They find that 
regulatory reforms to the energy infrastructure sector improved the credibility of its institutions 
and this supported Colombia to turn into an exporter and a successful investor in other countries. 
These reforms were enacted without large public funds, but with substantial financing and 
administration from the private sector.  
3. Factors that contribute to infrastructure failures  
3.1 Poor civil engineering practices 
The major factors associated with poor civil engineering practices resulting in the failure of 
infrastructure projects include inadequate initial design and design changes, an insufficient initial 
budget, lack of supervision, unexpected events, a lack of professional experience and 
competence, inadequate quality of work, poor budget and resource management and a lack of 
knowledge of construction and planning policy, find Forcada, et al. (2017). In many of these 
cases, repeating construction work is not formally measured or acknowledged as there is a 
negative perception that admission would damage the contractor’s corporate reputation 
(Forcada, et al., 2017). The findings from this study include (Forcada, et al., 2017): 
 Inadequate initial design and design changes: poor documentation and technical 
designs/specifications, particularly when there is a lack of on-site technical inspection 
and validation, can result in scope and associated budget modifications. These 
significantly increase construction costs and can delay the programme of project 
milestones. The knock on effect of an inadequate initial design is increased pressure on 
consultants to complete revised in a short time period leading to mistakes and further 
design issues.  
 Insufficient initial budget: consequences of an inaccurate budget are uncertainty due 
to frequent changes, a significant increase of work with available resources and overall 
confusion about the termination of works. 
 Lack of supervision: project supervision is required to ensure that projects are built in 
accordance with the requirements in contract documentations, specification and 
standards. This is often missing due to a lack of required specific expertise. A lack of 
technical visits by the municipality when defining the project’s scope and end users’ 
(community) inexperience in defining project needs also contributes to extra work during 
7 
 
construction. Many infrastructure projects are divided into different subprojects and 
carried out by independent contractors with a lack of coordinated supervision and 
independent milestones (Forcada et al., 2017). For example, the 1,000 km Ruta del Sol 
highway project, connecting Bogotá to other urban areas of the country and the 
Caribbean coast, was initially conceived by the government as a single project but it was 
later divided into three concessions to ease its construction and financing and to mitigate 
risk (World Bank, 2014b). The construction of the road was awarded to the Brazilian 
engineering firm Odebrecht and local partners. However, due to alleged bribery of 
Colombian officials the project was initially suspended and then cancelled (World Bank, 
2011). 
 Inadequate quality of execution: rework costs because of poor project execution and 
management problems are incurred by the contractor, whereas rework costs due to 
scope modifications are incurred by the client but have to be allocated in the awarded 
budget. Constant modifications and scope changes created by poor execution and the 
client’s inability to finish the project on time are the most important factors of cost 
increase. 
 Unexpected events: the poor understanding and knowledge of the nature of unexpected 
events leads to the underestimation of risks. Undertaking design reviews and 
verifications is the first step in minimising the potential impact of uncertainties, although 
they will not prevent errors from occurring. 
 Lack of experience and competence: the inexperience and incompetence of 
contractors results in substandard work. A lack of professional experience and 
competence hinders scope development, increases workload, and subsequently reduces 
the time available to consultants to complete their work on time causing design errors 
and omissions within contract documentation. This is primarily because technical visits, 
reviews and verifications are not undertaken. If such errors and omissions are not 
identified until construction is being undertaken a significant amount of design 
modifications will arise.  
 Inadequate quality of work: unviable work appears when a project or an activity could 
not be performed according to the contract content because of errors in the design 
documentation or a lack of resources allocated to that activity or project. This is 
exacerbated by a lack of adequate supervision. 
 Budget and resource management: the poor financial position of many contractors can 
be aggravated by inadequate budgetary management when allocating material and 
equipment resources among the various projects. Thus, resources shortages may occur, 
which result in delays and work having to be redone increasing cost. 
 Lack of knowledge of construction and planning policy: a lack of professional 
experience in construction imposes pressure on workers to complete the work and 
causes inconsistencies between actual work and specifications stipulated in the contact 
documentation. 
Examples 
The Chirajara Bridge – located between Bogotá and Villavicencio collapsed in 2018 because of 
the poor design of its beams and bracings (Aguilar, et al., 2018). The investigations by different 
companies (some contracted by the agency in charge of the project – Coviandes) found the 
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collapse was due to a combination of ‘design errors’, and not the climate nor any other external 
factors (Aguilar, et al., 2018, p.9). A technical article by Aguilar, et al. (2018, p.10) found that 
retrospectively that the design errors could have been avoided if tests on resistance and tension 
had been taken into account, and that these were not taken in account when the bridge was 
being built. 
They conclude that as Colombia has a broad variety of geological conditions, topologies and 
environments, it is important that standards should exist for all types of projects – including both 
new projects and repairs. These standards should have a list of minimum requirements for 
design and construction, and should be applied rigorously to make construction projects more 
reliable (Aguilar, et al., 2018). Standard tests should be undertaken to understand how the 
materials will behave under different conditions (Aguilar, et al., 2018). 
So far there is little analysis on the relationship between the Chirajara Bridge collapse and the 
management and procurement of the project. However, there was a debate in the congress 
about it in April 2018 which raised many interesting questions.2 The costs of the reconstruction of 
the bridge will be paid by the insurers (Garcia Sierra, 2018; 2016). 
Space – a high rise building in the city of Medellin, collapsed in 2013 because of design and 
construction failures. Investigations by different groups of experts concluded that if Space had 
been designed complying with all of the applicable requirements of the 1997 Law 400 and its 
regulations (NSR-98), it would not have collapsed (Universidad de los Andes, n.d.). 
3.2 Natural disasters 
Colombia has one of the highest recurrence rates of natural disasters in Latin America and has 
on average 600 such events each year; disasters resulting from natural hazards represent an 
important challenge for Colombia’s fiscal sustainability and stability (World Bank, 2016a; Hoyos, 
et al., 2012). Floods and landslides are the major damaging events to infrastructure (Hoyos, et 
al., 2012). For example, heavy floods during the construction of Colombia’s largest hydroelectric 
dam project in north-western Colombia, resulted in thousands of people having to be evacuated 
and the destruction of two bridges, two schools, and a health centre. The situation has been 
exacerbated by the failure of large pumps and poor disaster management.3 Heavy rains further 
complicate the maintenance and operation of surface transport by inhibiting repairs and 
upgrades and cause frequent landslides on important routes (Wettling, et al., 2015). Figure 3 
illustrates the distribution of exposure of Colombia’s land mas to flooding, earthquakes and 
landslides.   
                                                   
 
2 See – http://190.26.211.101:8080/comisionquinta/index.php/orden-del-dia/ordenes-del-dia-anteriores/ano-
2018/306-orden-del-dia-martes-24-de-abril-de-2018/file  
3 The Guardian (2018) Colombia: tens of thousands ordered to evacuate after floods at dam. The Guardian. 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/may/16/colombia-tens-of-thousands-of-ordered-to-evacuate-after-
floods-at-dam  
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Figure 3: Area exposed to floods, landslides, and earthquakes 
 
Source: World Bank, 2016a 
The Lizama 158 well in the northern Santander department had a crude oil spill starting in March 
2018. It took the company around three weeks to react to the leak, by which time huge amounts 
of oil had damaged the environment, killing animals and displacing communities.  
In an article in the Universidad Nacional Periódico Digital, based on doctoral research, Garcia 
Sierra (2018) argues that the Hidroituango, Chirajara and Lizama well disasters result from 
shortcomings in the way decisions were taken about environmental risks. He explains that the 
proposals and environmental studies for megaprojects in Colombia are evaluated internally, not 
independently. Those leading the megaprojects – the construction companies or the financiers – 
are those that select the small group of “experts” to evaluate the environmental risks (Garcia 
Sierra, 2018).  
The environmental studies written by these internal experts dismiss the idea of “unpredictability”, 
declaring the possible environmental scenarios to be wholly “predictable”, deterministic and 
resolvable. However, the common thread of these three disasters is that the events that have 
occurred have been “unpredictable” and difficult to resolve. Following the disaster, many of the 
experts involved in these projects have attributed the disasters to “unpredictable” situations, 
which contradicts their original environmental studies that denied unpredictability (Garcia Sierra, 
2018).  
Policies to manage and mitigate natural disaster risks 
The GoC recognises the importance of mitigating natural disaster risks and has taken several 
steps to mainstream disaster risk management into its policy and programmes, as stated in the 
National Development Plan, “Prosperity for All 2010 – 2014” and the Ministry of Finance and 
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Public Credit’s (MHCP) Strategic Plan. The MHCP is committed to developing strategies for 
reducing disaster related liabilities and to manage the fiscal risk resulting from such events 
(World Bank, 2013). MHCP works with the National Procurement Agency, Colombia Compra 
Eficiente (CCE), the ANI, the Colombian Geological Service (SGC), and the National Disaster 
Risk Management Unit (UNGRD) (World Bank, 2016a). MHCP identifies three policy objectives 
to strengthen the management of GoC’s contingent liabilities and support macroeconomic 
stability (World Bank, 2016a): 
1. Identification and understanding of fiscal risk due to disasters  
2. Financial management of natural disaster risk 
3. Catastrophe risk insurance for public assets 
Identification and understanding of natural disasters 
Identification and understanding of fiscal risk due to natural disasters is the first step in managing 
natural disaster risks. The damaging effects of extreme events are evaluated by analysing the 
vulnerability of exposed infrastructure. For example, the amount of land subject to flooding is an 
indication of degree of exposure (World Bank, 2016a). Exposure refers to the frequency, severity 
and extent of specific hazard. In addition, resilience of infrastructures to natural disasters is 
important. Proper risk management plan reduces the vulnerability of infrastructure exposed to 
natural hazards (Bernal, et al., 2017).  
Although the GoC has made progress in assessment of its infrastructure reliability in relation to 
natural disasters, further analysis is required to refine this assessment. The GoC has only partial 
information, and the available information is scattered throughout various government entities. In 
order to improve the understanding of fiscal risk generated by disasters, the MHCP will prioritise 
the following activities (World Bank, 2016a): 
 Improve information on the exposure of infrastructure to natural disasters, as well 
as historical information on disaster losses to the public sector. In particular the 
MHCP needs to better understand the potential losses in the case of disasters, to inform 
decision-making on investment in disaster risk mitigation and in new assets, and to 
improve insurance coverage for its existing assets. 
 Use and promote the use of financial decision-making tools. These tools help MCHP 
assess its financial response capacity post-disaster and to improve decision-making on 
its disaster risk financing. This also enables the MCHP to design an optimal combination 
of financial instruments through cost benefit and dynamic financial analysis. 
 Evaluate and adopt tools to assess possible increases in natural disaster risk 
generated by new public works and public-private partnerships (PPP). The MHCP 
applies risk assessment tools to evaluate the contributions of proposed new investments 
to final risk, including those made through PPPs. One important aspect of this work is the 
MHCP’s improvement of insurance requirements for concessionaries. The MHCP and 
ANI, with technical support from the World Bank, have jointly established standard terms 
and conditions and minimum requirements that meet international insurance market 
practice and must be included in new concessions contracts.  
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Financial management of natural disaster risk 
Natural disasters can generate fiscal volatility as a result of sudden, unexpected expenditures 
required during and after disasters. In the aftermath of disaster, the government requires timely 
access to financial resources required for an effective emergency and recovery response (World 
Bank, 2016a). In 2012 and 2013, the MHCP has made significant progress in designing a 
comprehensive strategy for the financial management of disasters (World Bank, 2016a). The 
MHCP strategy considers ex-ante and ex-post instruments, such as contingent credit line and 
insurance, in order to complement ex-post financial resources that will be accessed after a 
disaster. The MHCP promotes a multi-risk layering strategy for financial management of disaster 
risk based on the assessment of its contingent liabilities, as illustrated in Figure 4. 
Figure 4: Multi-layer financial strategy for disasters resulting from natural hazards 
 
Source: World Bank, 2016a  
The layers of MHCP financial strategy (see Figure 4) are explained below (World Bank, 2016a): 
 National fund for disaster risk management: The GoC will determine its level of risk 
retention through the National Fund for Disaster Risk Management (FNGRD). The 
budget allocations to the FNGRD are the first source of financial resources to be used in 
the case of a disaster. The FNGRD must first be operationalised and strengthened. 
When FNGRD resources are exhausted, and additional budgetary resources are not 
available or a more severe disasters occur, the government will access its second layer 
of risk retention contingent credit. 
 Contingent Credit: In the case of a severe natural disaster, the MHCP can immediately 
use part or all of the Catastrophe Deferred Drawdown Option (Cat DDO) to fund 
emergency relief and recovery efforts.  
 Evaluation of risk transfer instruments: These instruments aim to improve the 
Colombian government’s disaster response capacity in case of infrequent but potentially 
devastating and costly natural disasters by providing access to immediate liquidity post 
disaster. 
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Catastrophic risk insurance for public assets 
The MHCP aims to reduce the government’s contingent liabilities related to natural disasters 
through a combination of risk mitigation investments and the provision of catastrophic insurance 
for public assets (World Bank, 2016a). The strategy aims to improve the coverage and price of 
catastrophic insurance for public assets and road infrastructure (particularly priority transportation 
infrastructure, one of the sectors to have been most severely affected by disasters).  
The GoC will implement the following to improve its strategy of insurance of public assets (World 
Bank, 2016a): 
 Information system on public buildings: the MHCP is gathering additional information 
of assets as well as existing insurance policies. More detailed information on public 
assets will allow the private insurance industry to offer better coverage and prices, based 
on improved quantification of risk. 
 Collective approach to insuring public buildings: the GoC is evaluating the 
implementation of a collective approach to insurance of public buildings. This approach 
will allow the GoC to take advantage of risk diversification benefits. 
 Improvement of insurance of transport infrastructure through PPP scheme: with 
international support from the World Bank, the Colombian government has developed a 
document of technical guidelines for infrastructure insurance based on international 
market standards. The document has been used to develop the technical requirements 
for concessionaries for the latest generation of infrastructure investment. 
 “Best Practice” insurance guidelines for subnational entities: The MHCP is building 
on its recent experience with developing a collective insurance scheme and PPP’s 
insurance requirements to develop guidelines on strengthening insurance of public 
assets for subnational government entities.  
3.3 Corruption, transparency and the politicisation of infrastructure 
Corruption costs the country $7.2 billion annually which adds up to nearly 10% of the 
government’s 2017 budget (International Monetary Fund, 2018). In the Transparency 
International’s 2012 Corruption Perception Index, Colombia received its worse score in ten years 
and was ranked 94 out of 176 countries (Gutiérrez, 2013). Due to corruption, public works are 
often unfinished or abandoned, wasting government and tax payer’s money (International 
Monetary Fund, 2018).  
Policies to reduce corruption  
The GoC has introduced the following to reduce corruption (International Monetary Fund, 2018): 
 Comprehensive anti-corruption legal framework: in 2013, Colombia joined the 
Convention on Combating Bribery of Public Officials to provide a framework to fight 
transnational offenses and sanctions related to public contracting. Other recent measures 
include a decree establishing the list of politically exposed persons who would be subject 
to additional surveillance. In May 2017 Colombia obtained the accession approval from 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Public Governance 
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committee which oversees issues related to governance structure, transparency and 
accountability.  
 Improvements in the legal framework and wider access to information and 
organisational changes within the public sector: the Transparency and Access to 
Information Law (2014) defined a set of public sector employees and entities that are 
obliged to publish information. The Citizen Participation Law (2015) sets organisational 
principles to guide community selection and planning of public investment projects. Other 
publicly available data sources include the public contracting information system which 
has helped identify instances in which public contacts are illegally modified. Furthermore, 
the agency ANI is helping deal with a key source of corruption (public 
contracting/procurement) and represents an example of the efforts to improve the public 
sector organisation e.g. by ring-fencing agencies/activities historically prone to corruption. 
Although Colombia has strengthened its anti-corruption legal framework and data transparency 
and organisational changes as discussed above, some indications suggest a weak perception of 
corruption. Surveys suggest that corruption has remained in the top two of the most problematic 
factors for doing business in Colombia since 2012, and Colombia’s trust in politicians has 
worsened reaching a score of 1.7 (out of 7) in the WEF’s 2017-18 report (International Monetary 
Fund, 2018). For example, the Fourth Generation (4G) infrastructure agenda suffered delays in 
2017. During 2016, about eight 4G projects reached financial closure and some started the 
building phase (International Monetary Fund, 2018).  
The unfolding of the Odebrecht scandals (a giant Brazilian engineering and construction 
organisation which bribed $27 million to Colombian officials to win Ruta del Sol road building 
contract), led to the annulment of a project that was not part of the 4G agenda, but nevertheless 
created legal uncertainty about liquidation values in cases of corruption. In response to the 
scandal, banks tightened credit conditions to infrastructure projects (International Monetary Fund, 
2018). Moreover, the FDN received a capital injection and facilitated the diversification of 
infrastructure funding away from local banks. Due to FDN efforts, the 4G agenda has received 
funding from other local and foreign sources (International Monetary Fund, 2018). About two 
thirds of the financing so far has been local which includes mostly equity and local bank loans. 
Debt and equity have attracted funding from local and international institutional investors. 
Furthermore, 4G projects have issued some global bonds as well as received foreign equity and 
bank loans (International Monetary Fund, 2018).  
3.4 Infrastructure sabotage 
Infrastructure sabotage associated with Colombia’s ongoing conflict armed conflict can cause 
large economic losses and disruptions of service (Beittel, 2015). Historically, infrastructure 
sabotage has been carried by different guerrilla groups, BACRIM, and paramilitary groups over 
its 50+ years of conflict. The conflict also led to widespread damage to infrastructure (not through 
sabotage), and the Colombian state has been a key actor in that. Colombia’s conflict has gone 
through many different phases over the course of 50+ years, and today’s conflict (including  
sabotage and damage to infrastructure) is greatly diminished compared to other points in history 
(notably the peak in violence and conflict activity around 2002) (Herbert & Menocal, 2014).  
Drugs trafficking has been an important cause and dynamic in Colombia’s conflict - among other 
things, it has been a key source of funding for many of the armed groups associated with 
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violence focused on infrastructure sabotage (Herbert & Menocal, 2014; Beittel, 2015). For 
example, in 2015, the vandalism of two fibre optic cables caused disruption to one of Colombia’s 
biggest internet service providers (Beittel, 2015). 
Although it is difficult to avoid these events or predict when and where acts of sabotage will 
occur, a quick assessment of the situation can help operators take appropriate actions to avoid 
cascading events and the resulting partial or total infrastructure failure (Corredor & M.E, 2011). 
For example, the mechanical failures that result from malicious attacks on a transmission line are 
basically the same as those that occur when extreme natural events affect a portion of the 
transmission line (Corredor & M.E, 2011). Thus, any analysis conducted in respect to natural 
events can also help in taking preventive and corrective action when acts of sabotage are 
directed at the infrastructure. 
The current peace agreement between the GoC and the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de 
Colombia (FARC) is probably the most important opportunity to foster inclusive growth and close 
the regional disparities Colombia has had for decades. Agreed investments will cover more than 
half of the nation’s territory and a third of its towns with much needed infrastructure and social 
spending. Implementation of the peace agreement is expected to gain momentum throughout 
2018 as the programme’ institutional capacities are strengthening (International Monetary Fund, 
2018). 
3.5 The politicisation of infrastructure 
An ongoing series of papers by IABD (2018, forthcoming)4 on megaprojects in different Latin 
American case study countries highlight how infrastructure megaprojects tend to be politicised. 
This means that political criteria often dominate decision-making, and that projects influence, and 
are influenced by the election cycle. The IADB (2018, forthcoming) case study on Colombia 
focusses on the development of the Transmilenio and the Sistema Integrado de Transporte 
Público (SITP) (Bus rapid transit (BRT) system) during 2001 to 2015. It charts the history of the 
project, against the political context, and finds that over the course of the megaproject, political 
agreements constantly influenced the technical solutions that were developed, and what was 
approved – e.g. in every stage of the development process different levels of depth in the 
prefeasibility and feasibility evaluations, and during Enrique Peñalosa’s first six months tenure as 
mayor no prefeasibility or feasibility studies were commissioned (IADB, 2018a, forthcoming).   
Doctoral research by Garcia Sierra (2016) focusses on decision-making and finds that 
megaproject infrastructure proposals and the accompanying environmental studies are often 
evaluated internally, and not independently. The internal studies are often carried out, 
commissioned or led by the construction companies or the financiers of the projects (García 
Sierra, 2018). The process of selecting the “experts” for evaluations is often slow and thus 
becomes economical only for the big companies to do. These biases lead to weak decisions. 
                                                   
 
4 Based on draft version of the IADB (2018, forthcoming) paper 
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4. Lessons and recommendations  
This section summarises lessons and recommendations presented in the literature. 
Improve decentralisation to improve road infrastructure 
Yepes et al. (2013) recommend focussing on improving decentralisation in Colombia to support 
the structuring of projects at the local level in the construction and maintenance of secondary and 
tertiary roads. They argue that the process of decentralisation of Colombia’s road infrastructure, 
initiated properly in 1991 and 1993, has been ‘incomplete’, badly designed, and has not worked 
well (Yepes et al., 2013, p.41). While the division of competencies is in theory clear, in practice it 
is ambiguous. There is no stable flow of resources for construction, rehabilitation and 
maintenance of the secondary and tertiary roads. For this reason, maintenance is done in a 
reactive way, not a preventative way. And there is sometimes a lack of connection between the 
way the funding is generated (e.g. a tax on diesel and gasoline) and the way that funding is spent 
(in this case, on road maintenance). (Yepes et al., 2013). 
Most of the local entities do not have the capacity for planning and management of infrastructure 
investment projects. This particularly affects the abilities of the local entities’ ability to identify and 
structure medium and long-term plans and that take advantage of economies of scale in 
maintenance (Yepes et al., 2013, p.53) and problematic incentives are generated by the lack of 
precise inventories, and the lack of clear guidelines on the type of road (national, department or 
municipal) (Yepes et al., 2013, p.53). 
Adaption to climate change 
Yepes, et al. (2013) highlight that the traditional ways of adaption and mitigation are insufficient 
in the face of climate change forecasts. Colombia’s complex climate – with tropical rain, 
landslides and mountainous topography – makes building transport infrastructure difficult. The 
winter floods of 2010 and 2011 saw significant losses to Colombia’s transport infrastructure – 
estimated at $3.4 billion pesos or 0.62% of GDP in 2010 – which was almost half of the 
investment in transport infrastructure that year (Yepes et al., 2013, p.28). While it was an 
’abnormal’ weather event, it highlighted the importance of better planning for extreme weather, 
climate change and disasters (Yepes et al., 2013). The losses from 2010-2011 were partly due to 
the long-standing problems of low technical standards used historically to build transport 
infrastructure, and institutional failures (Yepes et al., 2013). 
They suggest: revising the criteria used to make investment decisions; increasing the amount of 
information available to make decisions including providing a structure for procurement that 
adequately factors in future risk into the investment decisions; and the creation and updating of 
maps of vulnerable zones (Yepes et al., 2013). 
Rules of contracting 
Yepes, et al., (2013) suggest various aspects to improve the rules of contracting, highlighting that 
that the rules of contracting for big long-term projects should be different to those that govern the 
purchases of state supplies. There should be a focus on generating the right incentives for 
contractors to improve the quality of their work and to contribute to their maintenance. This could 
be by establishing contracts that join construction with maintenance responsibilities. This would 
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mitigate against the trend whereby contractors engage in continual negotiations with the 
expectation that even once they win a contract, they can renegotiate it (Yepes et al., 2013). 
Deloitte (2017, p.43) finds that the 2012 APP law has improved concessional contracts by 
limiting the capacity of renegotiation and by establishing obligatory processes to include APPs in 
regional and national plans.  
Forcada et al. (2017) suggest that a design freeze should be applied as early as possible to 
minimise rework occurrence during construction. However, a design freeze is effective only if 
highly skilled professionals develop the client’s project brief to their requirements and effectively 
communicate this brief to all contractual participants involved. The time to rectify any error can 
affect the project’s milestone, require costly design changes (especially during the construction 
phase), may lead to unscheduled programme overruns and causes inconsistencies between 
actual construction work and specifications stipulated in contract documentation (Forcada, et al., 
2017). 
To conclude, World Bank (2016b) argue there is a need to overhaul technical capacities to 
strengthen policy-making functions and move away from short-term and reactive solutions and 
management and a long-term infrastructure investment plan is needed. In addition, contract 
management functions need to be supplemented by implementing the following (World Bank, 
2016b): 
 Institutional specialisation in managing pre-defined types of obligations that are present 
across all concession agreements (insurance requirements, performance bonds, 
supervision of quality of service) 
 Quality certification for policies and procedures to provide a sense of security to private 
sector participants and infrastructure users 
 Intelligent use of outsourcing possibilities for tasks that could be better handled by third 
parties 
 Training and professional development programmes to build a team of experienced 
contract managers  
 A governance structure that shields the function from potential outside interference 
In terms of improving the planning and structuring capabilities of transport PPPs, they argue, the 
government could consider designing and implementing a capacity building programme on 
PPP’s for public structuring agencies (World Bank, 2014a). Such a programme would provide 
structured training to public sector officials responsible for the preparation and evaluation of 
investment projects. Refining the PPP project cycle and establishing more detailed guidelines 
and procedures is also useful (World Bank, 2014a).  
If job creation is the reason of contracting unskilled personnel, training must be provided in order 
to improve work practices. If municipalities do not begin to re-examine their contract clauses and 
procedures, then there is a danger that errors become more frequent and will adversely impact 
the overall profitability and the performance of projects (Forcada, et al., 2017). Choosing 
contractors based on experience and solvency and ensuring that resources are available to 
undertake the required work are other recommendations to minimise errors and reworks. 
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Public-private funding 
While the lack of private funding is often highlighted as a problem, Deloitte (2017) highlight the 
challenges of too much private funding. They explain how in 1991 the government ‘practically 
delegated the development of the national port sector to the private sector’, whereby all of the 
ports developed after 1991 were the result of private sector initiatives (Deloitte, 2017, p.162). 
This meant that the ports reflected the specific interests of those actors, but not of the national 
interest, nor of the market, and there was a lack of overall planning and oversight (Deloitte, 2017, 
p.162). 
5. Acronyms 
PPP:   Private/Public Partnership 
ANI:   National Infrastructure Agency 
FDN:   Financiera de Desarrollo Nacional 
MHCP:  Ministry of Finance and Public Credit 
CCE:   Colombia Compra Eficiente 
FARC:  Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia Ejército del Pueblo 
SGC:   Colombia Geological Services 
UNGRD:  National Disaster Risk Management Unit 
GoC:   Government of Colombia 
Cat DDO:  Catastrophe Deferred Drawdown Option 
WEF:   World Economic Forum 
OECD:  Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
APP:  Asociaciones Público Privadas 
FNGRD: National Fund for Disaster Risk Management 
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